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Articles
Territorial Colonization in Late Imperial 
Russia
Stages in the Development of a Concept
Alberto MAsoero
At the Paris Exposition universelle of 1900, the tsarist pavilion included 
a section devoted to the empire’s peripheries. The map prepared for the 
occasion traced an arc that stretched from the northernmost regions of 
European Russia to Siberia, the Steppe Region, Turkestan, and the Caucasus. 
The idea of the progressive “colonization” of these vast, sparsely populated 
territories became a political imperative in the last ten years of the empire. 
Prime Minister Petr Arkad´evich Stolypin assigned a central place to it in his 
program of reforms. By the eve of World War I, there was a sizable literature 
on “resettlement” ( pereselenie) and “colonization” (kolonizatsiia), a body of 
knowledge built up over time through careful study of foreign models. It 
comprised theoretical treatises, manuals, and specialized periodicals such 
as Voprosy kolonizatsii (Questions of Colonization, 1907–17). In 1914, an 
authoritative semi-official publication proclaimed that the “lands of Asiatic 
Russia are an indivisible and inseparable part of our state and at the same time 
our only colony.”1 How did this terminology become part of the imperial 
This article is part of a larger project on representations of resettlement and spatial transfor-
mation in late imperial Russia. I am indebted to many colleagues who commented on earlier 
versions of the manuscript or discussed the subject with me. I am grateful in particular to Mark 
Bassin, Jane Burbank, Marco Buttino, Alexander Etkind, Andrea Graziosi, Peter Holquist, 
Niccolò Pianciola, Ekaterina Pravilova, Paolo Sartori, Willard Sunderland, Natalia Suvorova, 
and Richard Wortman, as well as to the journal’s anonymous referees. The greatest debt is, 
however, to the generous help of Anatolii Remnev, Siberian historian of the empire. This essay 
is dedicated to his memory. 
 1 Aziatskaia Rossiia: Izdanie Pereselencheskogo upravleniia glavnogo upravleniia zemleustroistva 
i zemledeliia, 3 vols. (St. Petersburg: A. F. Marks, 1914), 1:viii. The words “indivisible and 
inseparable part of our state” echoed article 1 of the Fundamental Laws of 1906. See Peter 
Holquist, “Dilemmas of a Progressive Administrator: Baron Boris Nolde,” Kritika 7, 2 (2006): 
248, 266.
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lexicon? What exactly did Russian authors mean by “colonization” and 
what nuances did the meaning of the word acquire in the decades before 
the revolution? This article explores the colonization discourse articulated 
by Russia’s intellectual and administrative elite, including unofficial and 
oppositionist components. It traces how a modern vision of resettlement 
emerged from older patterns of territorial transformation, careful study of 
the Western colonial experience, and the need to respond to the challenges 
created by the political and intellectual context of the postreform era.
“Colonization” is not understood here as a word describing centuries 
of spatial and demographic history. The subject of this analysis is not the 
socio-economic fact of peasant migration but the conceptualizations that 
accompanied it. The concept was adopted selectively from European 
literature around the middle of the 19th century. Here it is examined as it 
evolved through a discussion about populating and transforming the empire’s 
peripheral, mostly eastern regions—a discourse about organizing population 
transfers, establishing a human presence, and assigning resources. Like other 
European expansions, the reality of Russian settlement in the east was the 
outcome of “a messy convergence of private impertinence and the coercive 
might of the state.”2 Government policy was merely one of the factors 
 2 John C. Weaver, The Great Land Rush and the Making of the Modern World, 1650–1900 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003), 5.
Map of the Peripheries of the Russian Empire
Source: P. P. Semenov-Tian-Shanskii, ed., Okrainy Rossii: Sibir´, Turkestan, Kavkaz i 
poliarnaia chast´ Evropeiskoi Rossii, s prilozheniem karty okrain Rossiiskoi imperii  
(St. Petersburg: Brokgauz and Efron, 1900).
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affecting the borderlands’ development, and the examination of theories of 
colonization should not be confused with the history of the colonized regions, 
which depended on many local dynamics not examined here.
The theme has drawn a good deal of attention in the historiography, from 
different viewpoints.3 Mark Bassin investigated the relationship between 
geographical representations and national identity. Willard Sunderland 
explored how the public at large viewed resettlement and how it was perceived 
by peasants. He has rescued the topic of territorial transformation from pre-
revolutionary historiography and constructed the long-term periodization 
essential for assessing the discontinuity of the late imperial approach. 
A. V. Remnev considered colonization as a process of institutional and 
mental appropriation of Siberia, Central Asia, and the Far East, a discourse 
about empire and nation building. His and N. G. Suvorova’s analysis of 
contemporaries’ perceptions of settlers is unsurpassed in depth and subtlety, 
helping to explain the particular intensity of colonization policies in the 
years before the war. Alexander Etkind has offered a cultural interpretation 
of imperial history in the light of the concept of “internal colonization.” His 
analysis leaves open the question of what political forms this broad cultural 
paradigm assumed at different times, especially when the term “colonization” 
was used explicitly to describe migration to the peripheries.4
 3 Examples of classic studies are Donald Treadgold, The Great Siberian Migration: Government 
and Peasant in Resettlement from Emancipation to the War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1957); François-Xavier Coquin, La Sibérie: Peuplement et immigration paysanne au XIX 
siècle (Paris: Institut d’études slaves, 1969); and L. F. Skliarov, Pereselenie i zemleustroistvo v 
Sibiri v gody stolypinskoi agrarnoi reformy (Leningrad: Izdatel´stvo Leningradskogo universiteta, 
1962). For overviews of the historiography on the theme, see Nicholas Breyfogle, Abby 
Schrader, and Willard Sunderland, eds., Peopling the Russian Periphery: Borderland Colonization 
in Eurasian History (London: Routledge, 2007), 1–18; Breyfogle, “Enduring Imperium: 
Russia/Soviet Union/Eurasia as Multiethnic, Multiconfessional Space,” Ab Imperio, no.1 
(2008): 108–16; and Willard Sunderland, “What Is Asia to Us? Scholarship on the Tsarist 
‘East’ since the 1990s,” Kritika 12, 4 (2011): 817–33.
 4 Mark Bassin, Visions of Empire: Nationalist Imagination and Geographical Expansion in 
the Russian Far East, 1840–1865 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Bassin, 
“Turner, Solov´ev, and the ‘Frontier Hypothesis’: The Nationalist Signification of Open 
Spaces,” Journal of Modern History 65, 3 (1993): 473–511; Willard Sunderland, Taming the 
Wild Field: Colonization and Empire on the Russian Steppe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2004); Sunderland, “Empire without Imperialism? Ambiguities of Colonization in 
Tsarist Russia,” Ab Imperio, no. 2 (2003): 101–14; Sunderland, “Peasant Pioneering: Russian 
Peasant Settlers Describe Colonisation and the Eastern Frontier, 1880–1910s,” Journal of 
Social History 34, 1 (2001): 895–922; A. V. Remnev, “Vdvinut´ Rossiiu v Sibir´: Imperiia i 
russkaia kolonizatsiia vtoroi poloviny XIX–nachala XX vv.,” Ab Imperio, no. 3 (2003): 135–
58; Remnev and N.  G. Suvorova, “Upravliaemaia kolonizatsiia i stikhiinye migratsionnye 
protsessy na aziatskikh okrainakh Rossiiskoi imperii,” Politika, nos. 3–4 (2010): 150–91; 
Remnev and Suvorova, “ ‘Russkoe delo’ na aziatskikh okrainakh: ‘russkost´’ pod ugrozoi ili 
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Recent studies have examined the Resettlement Administration 
(Pereselencheskoe upravlenie), created in 1896 as part of the Ministry of the 
Interior to supervise peasant migration beyond the Urals. In 1905, it became 
part of the Main Administration of Land Management and Agriculture 
(GUZZ), the ministry in charge of rural modernization. This institution 
most forcefully embodied, in the tsarist period, the ideal of transforming the 
peripheral territory from above. It has been interpreted variously as a step 
toward the emergence of Russia as a modern colonial empire (Sunderland), as 
a reflection of the persistence of an assimilationist Sonderweg—discursive and 
institutional (Remnev)—and as the cradle of a new technocratic ideology of 
mass mobilization (Peter Holquist).5
This article offers a synthesis that emphasizes the novelty and diversity of 
the concept of colonization in the postreform period. It underscores change 
and plurality of purpose, rather than continuity and singleness of intent. 
While building on Remnev’s foundational studies, it also seeks to disentangle 
the notion of an “imperial project” both chronologically and thematically. 
The debate on colonization was framed not solely by efforts to build an 
expanding empire but also by political ideologies of socialism, nationalism, 
and liberalism, as well as the contest surrounding the development of the 
modern state, such as disagreements over regional development and the 
peasant question. In this sense, the debate on colonization was not an 
entirely imperial matter, and it did not take place solely in the ministerial 
chancelleries. The emergence of public opinion permitted the expression of 
multiple viewpoints, often articulated by authors who opposed the tsarist 
state or pursued its overthrow. As in other aspects of Russian history, the 
line between officialdom and intelligentsia was blurred. Radical reformers 
were often the most vocal advocates of a marvelous destiny in the east and 
projected onto this “cause” a set of purposes which did not necessarily coincide 
with official ideology. Imperial notions of spatial integration were affected by 
views that ranged between populist ideals, liberal patriotism, and varieties of 
nationalism and spanned realism to social or productive utopias.
‘somnitel´nye kul´turtregery,’ ” Ab Imperio, no. 2 (2008): 157–222; Alexander Etkind, Internal 
Colonization: Russia’s Imperial Experience (Cambridge: Polity, 2011). See also David Moon, 
“Peasant Migration and the Settlement of Russia’s Frontiers, 1550–1897,” Historical Journal 
40, 4 (1997): 859–93.
 5 See the forum “Colonialism and Technocracy at the End of the Tsarist Era,” Slavic Review 
69, 1 (2010): 120–88, with contributions by Willard Sunderland, Peter Holquist, Robert 
Geraci, and David McDonald; and A. V. Remnev, “Rossiiskaia vlast´ v Sibiri i na Dal´nem 
Vostoke: Kolonializm bez Ministerstva kolonii—russkii ‘Sonderweg’?” in Imperium inter pares: 
Rol´ transferov v istorii Rossiiskoi imperii (1700–1917), ed. Martin Aust, Rikarda Vul´pius 
[Ricarda Vulpius], and Aleksei Miller (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2010), 150–81.
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This article traces a sequence of phases in the evolution of the meaning of 
colonization, an issue first addressed by Sunderland.6 It also explains how, at 
each stage, different motives interacted and reinforced each other in ways that 
crossed the political dividing line. I show that the prewar “urge to colonize”7 is 
best understood not merely as an attribute of Russia’s paradigmatic existence 
as an empire but as the product of a particular stage in its history: when the 
traditional political culture of an expanding dynastic state interacted with 
modern sensitivities that challenged its existence and prompted adaptation 
and reform.
Colonization without Colonies
In the first decades of the 19th century, the term “colony” was used to describe 
successful agricultural settlements and experiments in authoritarian social 
engineering. The latter were influenced by the ideas of Jeremy Bentham, such 
as “punitive colonization”—deportation as a means of re-educating prisoners 
and populating territory. Occasionally, “colony” was applied to the more 
remote and exotic imperial possessions, such as the Caucasus, Siberia, and 
“Russian America.” Even as late as 1869, Nashi kolonii (Our Colonies) was 
used as the title of a work on non-Russian settlements in the southern steppes, 
where “German” colonists had been invited to move in the hope that the 
industriousness of foreign farmers would improve Russian agriculture. This 
example in itself contradicts the idea of colonization as a civilizing mission, 
whether Russian or imperial, directed toward other peoples and territories. 
The word “resettlement,” later associated with the idea of a heroic national 
cause, also lacked a civilizing significance and was distinct from the notion of 
a Russian colonizing process.8
Peasant resettlement was originally viewed with suspicion, since the 
colonists were often fleeing serfs or religious dissidents.9 The experiments in 
supervised migration undertaken in the 1840s and 1850s by the Ministry 
of State Domains under Pavel Dmitrievich Kiselev, in charge of both state 
 6 Willard Sunderland, “The ‘Colonization Question’: Visions of Colonization in Late 
Imperial Russia,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 48, 2 (2000): 210–32.
 7 David McDonald, “Russian Statecraft after the Imperial Turn: The Urge to Colonize?” 
Slavic Review 69, 1 (2010): 185–88.
 8 A. A. Klaus, Nashi kolonii (St. Petersburg: Nuskal´t, 1869); Sunderland, Taming the Wild 
Field, 89. For a discussion of this terminology, see Sunderland, “The ‘Colonization Question,’ ” 
212–13. On Bentham, see Etkind, Internal Colonisation, 133–35; and Alessandro Stanziani, 
“The Traveling Panopticon: Labor Institutions and Labor Practices in Russia and Britain in 
the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 51, 4 
(2009): 715–41.
 9 Nicholas B. Breyfogle, Heretics and Colonizers: Forging Russia’s Empire in the South Caucasus 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005). 
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peasants and the public territories, were inspired by a productive logic (“so 
that there shall neither be unemployed hands nor uncultivated lands any 
longer”).10 Although this administration provided a reservoir of knowledge 
about moving people and shaping distant territories, the basis of its approach 
was the state’s decision to distribute the workforce over the land it held, rather 
than a vision of an imperial or national mission. These traditional policies of 
supervised migration were discussed in terms of future agrarian reforms and 
motivated by paternalistic social tutelage. They were conceived as a tsarist 
Sozialpolitik to alleviate the misery of the rural populace, reducing the need 
for land in villages of origin and promoting the growth of agriculture in “new 
places” farther from the center.11
Starting in the 1840s and throughout the reign of Alexander II, the specific 
nature of the Russian colonial model and its form of “colonization,” seen 
as aspects of imperial identity, were increasingly debated by the tsarist elite. 
Reflections on Russia’s place in relation to Western civilization also prompted 
questions about the historical significance of the empire’s eastern regions. 
The historical–philosophical debate on the relationship between Russia and 
Europe developed in tandem with the increasingly national orientation of 
the monarchical ideology that characterized the era of Nicholas I. Both were 
influenced by a multiplicity of stimuli: from the rising cult of the exotic to the 
romantic image of Siberia depicted in the memoirs of the exiled Decembrists 
to the practical need to elaborate government practices suitable for such 
heterogeneous regions, the institutionalization of geographical knowledge, and 
the explorations under the purview of the Naval Ministry. Historians such as 
Sergei Mikhailovich Solov´ev, Afanasii Prokof´evich Shchapov and especially 
Stepan Vasil´evich Eshevskii began to see populating the boundless territories 
as a key factor in Russia’s national history. The terrain was thus prepared for 
the well-known dictum later articulated by Vasilii Osipovich Kliuchevskii: “the 
history of Russia is the history of a country that colonizes itself.”12
10 G. K. Gins, Sel´skokhoziaistvennoe vedomostvo za 75 let ego deiatel´nosti (1837–1912) 
(Petrograd: GUZZ, 1914), 57–60; Aziatskaia Rossiia, 1:447–48.
11 The connection between poverty and resettlement can be seen in “O dopolnitel´nykh 
pravilakh pereseleniia malozemel´nykh gosudarstvennykh poselian v mnogozemel´nye 
mesta,” Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii, ser. 2, 55 vols. (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia 
II otdeleniia Sobstvennoi Ego Imperatorskogo Velichestva kantseliarii, 1830–34), vol. 18, 
no. 16718 (1843), 236. For an analysis of Kiselev’s projects within the debate on peasant 
land use, see Igor´ Khristoforov, “Mezhdu chastnym i kazennym: Krest´ianskaia reforma v 
gosudarstvennoi derevne, liberal´naia doktrina, i spory o sobstvennosti,” Rossiiskaia istoriia, no. 
2 (2011): 93–109; and Khristoforov, “Ot Speranskogo do Stolypina: Krest´ianskaia reforma i 
problema zemleustroistva,” Rossiiskaia istoriia, no. 4 (2011): 27–43.
12 S. M. Solov´ev, “O vliianii prirody russkoi gosudarstvennoi oblasti na ee istoriiu,” 
Otechestvennye zapiski, no. 2 (1850): 229–44; S. V. Eshevskii, “Russkaia kolonizatsiia 
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While the defeat in the Crimean War appeared to underscore Russia’s 
inferiority to the West, the conquest of Amur in 1857–60 fed hopes of 
greatness on its Pacific shores. A few years later, enterprising commanders 
brought vast tracts of Central Asia and Turkestan under the sovereignty of the 
tsar. Although these conquests were largely an extension of an autochthonous 
expansionistic pattern, the political context and the geographic location of the 
territories annexed or definitively brought under control (the regions beyond 
the Caucasus mountain chain, Central Asia beyond the Hungry Steppe, and 
the Pacific coast) made it plausible to compare these new tsarist possessions 
to European colonies.
In 1861, a few days after the emancipation of the serfs, the Imperial 
Geographic Society held a conference on the “colonization of the frontier regions” 
attended by dignitaries, young officials, and experts. The same patriotic and 
civic commitment that inspired the campaign against serfdom, a “scandalous” 
vestige that made it impossible for Russia to consider itself a modern European 
nation, also fed aspirations for a grand colonizing mission to the east. A few 
years earlier, Aleksandr Ivanovich Herzen had celebrated Sergei Timofeevich 
Aksakov’s resettlement saga, A Family Chronicle (1856), as the harbinger 
of Russia’s destiny to “spread in all directions … like a wealthy settler who 
ploughs the virgin land of Wisconsin or Illinois. It is like a novel by [Fenimore] 
Cooper!”13 Mikhail Ivanovich Veniukov, a young military cartographer who 
later became one of the first theorists of a Russian geopolitical destiny in Asia, 
attended the conference. In the late 1860s, he was a correspondent for Herzen’s 
journal Kolokol, where he caustically commented on the generals’ ineptitude 
in Turkestan, criticizing the tsarist expansion’s “lack of method,” as opposed to 
the “conscious conquests” of a colonial policy, capable of generating “authentic 
awareness of our strengths and our powers.”14 
severovostochnogo kraia” (1857), Vestnik Evropy, no. 1 (1866): 211–57; A. P. Shchapov, 
“Zemstvo” (1862), in Sochineniia A. P. Shchapova, 3 vols. (St. Petersburg: Pirozhkov, 1906), 
1:753–59; K. N. Bestuzhev-Riumin, “O kolonizatsii Velikorusskogo plemeni,” Zhurnal 
Ministerstva narodnogo prosveshcheniia, no. 134 (1867): 776–84; V. O. Kliuchevskii, Kurs 
russkoi istorii, in Sochineniia, 9 vols. (Moscow: Mysl´, 1987), 1:50; Bassin, “Turner, Solov´ev, 
and the ‘Frontier Hypothesis,’ ” 473–511; Etkind, Internal Colonisation, 62–66. 
13 A. I. Gertsen, “Pis´mo k Dzhuzeppe Matstsini,” in Sobranie sochinenii (Moscow: Akademiia 
nauk SSSR, 1954–65), 13:341; Bassin, Visions of Empire, 12; Alberto Masoero, “La funzione 
dell’esempio americano in Herzen e Černyševskij,” in Il pensiero sociale russo: Modelli stranieri 
e contesto nazionale, ed. Masoero and Antonello Venturi (Milan: Franco Angeli, 2000), 48–49. 
The preparation of the peasant reform also stimulated the emergence of stronger nationalist 
attitudes toward the western peripheries. See M. D. Dolbilov and A. I. Miller, “Zapadnye 
okrainy v 1855–1862 gg.,” in Zapadnye okrainy Rossiiskoi imperii, ed. Dolbilov and Miller 
(Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2006), 139.
14 M. V. [Veniukov], “Primechaniia k budushchei istorii nashikh zavoevanii v Azii” (1867), 
Kolokol, no. 9 (repr. Moscow: Nauka, 1964): 6, 9; M. V. Veniukov, Rossiia i Vostok: Sobranie 
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In this, as in other instances, a question linked to the specific nature 
of Russia’s national history was examined through the lens of Western 
concepts. European treatises on the colonial theme—for example, Kolonien, 
Kolonialpolitik und Auswanderung (Colonies, Colonial Policy, and Emigration) 
by W. G. F. Roscher (1856) and De la colonisation chez les peuples modernes 
(On Colonization among Modern Peoples) by P. P. Leroy-Beaulieu (1874)—
provided Russians with a scholarly language for conceptualizing their recent 
territorial conquests, using terminology that was in many ways flattering and 
attractive. Roscher, a highly respected authority among Russian scholars of 
economic history, offered a classification of colonies. He saw the expanses 
of northern Eurasia as characterized by the gradual settlement of vast 
uninhabited spaces and likened Asiatic Russia to the “new lands” of Australia, 
Canada, and the United States, in this respect following the geographer Karl 
Ritter, one of the most influential sources of Russian knowledge on the East. 
Large parts of the tsarist peripheries were thus assigned to “agricultural” or 
“settlement colonies,” to a society which, according to Roscher, could develop 
more rapidly and freely than their country of origin. These colonies, one 
Russian interpreter claimed, offered the opportunity to “implement new 
ideas” and “create new social relations.”15 The idea resonated deeply among 
Russian intellectuals from Petr Iakovlevich Chaadaev to Nikolai Gavrilovich 
Chernyshevskii, who were accustomed to seeing Russia’s distance from 
European civilization as an advantage that could accelerate progress. 
Leroy-Beaulieu—promptly translated into Russian—introduced a 
qualitative distinction between colonization and migration. He held that 
“the savage and the barbarian emigrate,” driven by poverty or the desire 
to plunder, while civilized nations could consciously mold peoples and 
territories, bringing their culture with them, assimilating the colonized into 
geograficheskikh i politicheskikh statei (St. Petersburg: Bezobrazov, 1877), 68–134; M. V. 
[Veniukov], “Vopros o kolonizatsii,” Vremia, no. 10 (1861): 1–16. A. V. Remnev, “U istokov 
rossiiskoi imperskoi geopolitiki: Aziatskie ‘pogranichnye prostranstva’ v issledovaniiakh M. I. 
Veniukova,” Istoricheskie zapiski 4 (2001): 344–69; V. A. Esakov, Mikhail Ivanovich Veniukov, 
1832–1901 (Moscow: Nauka, 2002).
15 D. Zavalishin, “Koloniia kak vazhnaia stupen´ v razvitii chelovechestva,” Vostochnoe 
obozrenie, no. 23 (23 June 1883), 8. W. G. F. Roscher, Kolonien, Kolonialpolitik und 
Auswanderung, 2nd ed. (Leipzig: Winter, 1885), 18, 54, 84, 116. Roscher’s work was first 
presented in Russia by I. N. Berezin, “Metropoliia i koloniia,” Otechestvennye zapiski, no. 3 
(1858): 84–115. See also “O evropeiskikh koloniiakh: O sochinenii Roshera ‘Kolonien und 
kolonialpolitik,’ ” in Sibirskii sbornik (St. Petersburg: n.p., 1887); K. Ritter, Zemlevedenie Azii 
(St. Petersburg: Bezobrazov, 1856), 1:89–90; and N. G. Sukhova, Karl Ritter i geograficheskaia 
nauka v Rossii (Leningrad: Nauka, 1990). 
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a superior civilization.16 Contemporaries were intrigued by the vision of a 
newly reformed and emancipated Russia emerging from serfdom as a great 
empire (or as a great Slavic nation, depending on their viewpoint), intent 
on colonizing its own borderlands. After all, in the mid-19th century every 
European power worthy of this name had, or sought to acquire, colonies.
Yet the adoption of the colonial paradigm also met with deep-seated 
resistance. The desirability of territorial expansion was not questioned. On 
the contrary, the more or less voluntary incorporation of new peoples had 
profound ideological significance. It was a symbol of the ruler’s reiterated 
legitimacy, a further proof of the tsar’s majesty. Yet the history of European 
colonialism since the late 18th century—viewed in Russia as a mirror for 
its past and future expansion—comprised numerous secessionist movements 
which had met with varying degrees of success, from the increasing autonomy 
of the British dominions to independence movements in Latin America, not 
to mention the exemplary case of the North American anticolonial revolution. 
Scholarly literature at this time showed that colonies “tend to separate from 
the metropolis to form free and powerful states.”17
The tsarist government was aware of its limited ability to rule its remote 
territories (at that time it was easier to get from St. Petersburg to New York 
than to Vladivostok), and it also feared that a charismatic viceroy with a 
following of overly enthusiastic young colonizers might attempt secession (in 
the 1850s, such suspicions circulated about Nikolai Nikolaevich Murav´ev, 
the conqueror of the Amur).18 The Polish revolt of 1863, too, was seen as 
the betrayal of a national periphery at the height of the Russian reforms. It 
coincided with the appropriation of the colonial discourse by the “Siberian 
patriots,” a small but active group, which, inspired by Roscher, interpreted 
him to mean that Siberia was one day destined to become independent from 
the St. Petersburg “metropolis.”19
The definition of colony—a source of wealth and prestige but also a 
society potentially capable of future independent growth—raised suspicion in 
16 P. Lerua-Bol´e (Pierre-Paul Leroy-Beaulieu), Kolonizatsiia u noveishikh narodov (St. 
Petersburg: Obshchestvennaia pol´za, 1877), iii.
17 Ibid., 459; Roscher, Kolonien, 84, 116.
18 A. V. Remnev, Samoderzhavie i Sibir´: Administrativnaia politika vtoroi poloviny XIX–
nachala XX vekov (Omsk: Omskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, 1997), 21; Bassin, Visions of 
Empire, 168.
19 For details on Siberian regionalists’ reception of the European colonial literature, see 
Alberto Masoero, “Il regionalismo siberiano nel contesto imperiale russo, 1855–1907,” 
Rivista storica italiana 116, 3 (2004): 1044–58; A. V. Remnev, “Zapadnye istoki sibirskogo 
oblastnichestva,” in Russkaia emigratsiia do 1917 goda—laboratoriia liberal´noi i revoliutsionnoi 
mysli (St. Petersburg: Evropeiskii dom, 1997), 142–56.
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a political tradition centered on the principle of the singleness of power. The 
spatial configuration of the autocratic state could accommodate the survival 
of segmented administrative entities, from the Kingdom of Poland to the 
Emirate of Bukhara, from the districts governed by the Cossack atamans to 
the lands of His Majesty’s Cabinet in Altai. The state admitted them, however, 
only as functional variations of sovereign power, the result of the historical–
geographical stratification of a dynastic empire. The heterogeneous complexity 
of imperial society was accompanied by an almost obsessive concern for 
territorial integrity and centralization of authority. The autocratic principle 
inhibited the adoption of a spatial hierarchy that might foreshadow, albeit 
implicitly, future political fragmentation and the devolution of sovereignty.
For this reason it also appeared dangerous, no matter how appealing it 
might be, to attribute to the Caucasus or to the region of Amur the political–
cultural status of a “Russian colony.” Mikhail Nikiforovich Katkov’s new 
style of postreform patriotism stressed the territorial integrity of the state 
and expressed fear of separatism. Nikolai Iakovlevich Danilevskii argued that 
calling the territories colonies meant implicitly admitting the existence of 
numerous “non-Russias within Russia,” joined to the center by an artificial 
bond.20 This danger was perceived with particular intensity by those closest to 
the reigning family and to the notion of state land as an indivisible dynastic 
heritage. At the 1861 conference on colonization, for example, Grand 
Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich strove to cool the patriotic enthusiasm and 
democratic ardor of some junior officials (radical opinions among them 
were by no means uncommon: young aristocrats and famous anarchists, 
such as Mikhail Aleksandrovich Bakunin and Petr Alekseevich Kropotkin, 
collaborated with Murav´ev in the Far East). According to one participant, 
Konstantin stressed that “in our country there is no true colonization, but 
merely migration [ pereselenie]” as a means “of enlarging the Russian state.” 
Minister of the Interior Dmitri Andreevich Tolstoi would later respond more 
bluntly: “We have no colonies.”21
These conflicting motives help explain the persistence of a lexical 
ambivalence surrounding the definition of colony and colonization. In the 
20 N. Ia. Danilevskii, Rossiia i Evropa (Moscow: Kniga, 1991), 485. Andreas Renner, “Defining 
a Russian Nation: Mikhail Katkov and the ‘Invention’ of National Politics,” Slavonic and 
East European Review 81, 4 (2003): 659– 82. On the emergence of a more assertive national 
imagery in the period of Great Reforms, see Olga Maiorova, From the Shadow of Empire: 
Defining the Russian Nation through Cultural Mythology, 1855–1870 (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 2010).
21 “O kolonizatsii,” Vek, no. 22 (7 July 1861) (proceedings of the Geographic Society conference 
on colonization). Tolstoi’s statement on colonies is quoted in Remnev, Samoderzhavie i Sibir´, 
23. 
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following decades, a rich literature on Asia and the “question of colonization” 
coexisted with the tendency to avoid the identity-creating dichotomy 
metropolis-colony. More neutral terminology was used instead: “peripheries,” 
“our possessions in Asia,” “borderlands,” or simply “regions.” Yet the words 
“resettlement” and “colonization” took a firm hold in Russian discourse, used 
to mean a spontaneous “unconscious” occupation of space ( pereselenie), on 
the one hand, and purposeful territorial transformation (kolonizatsiia), on 
the other.
Peasant Colonization as Imperial Reform
It was when colonization began to involve large-scale organization and 
investment of resources, during the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway 
between 1891 and 1903, that the term acquired an ambiguous reformist 
significance and a marked “agrarian” connotation.22 Renewed interest in the 
topic was related in part to the repercussions of the tsar’s assassination on 
1 March 1881, the first revolutionary crisis in the history of the Russian 
monarchy. Plans for internal migration were considered with greater urgency 
because, as a high-ranking official who was dealing with the question noted 
on 26 March, it was “essential for the reign [of Alexander III] to begin with 
widespread economic reforms.” The purpose of a proactive response to the 
challenge of the populist movement was evident. But even five years earlier, 
in 1876, a well-known treatise on the agrarian question had noted the 
relationship between the peasant problem and migration to the borderlands. 
According to Aleksandr Illarionovich Vasil´chikov, who summarized his 
conclusions in a long chapter entitled “Colonization,” a systematic program 
of resettlement to the “free and uninhabited lands” on Russia’s outer edges 
represented the “necessary completion” of the serfs’ emancipation. He saw 
colonization as preventing the emergence of an “agricultural proletariat” 
and satisfying the peasants’ need for land. The Siberian regionalist Nikolai 
Mikhailovich Iadrintsev—hardly a proponent of imperial assimilation—
formulated one of the earliest and most detailed plans for “conscious” and 
“organized” peasant colonization.23
The relationship between borderland colonization, reform in the 
“Russian interior,” and the political stability of the empire appeared in the 
22 Steven G. Marks, Road to Power: The Trans-Siberian Railroad and the Colonization of Asian 
Russia, 1850–1917 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 154.
23 Russkaia gosudarstvennaia biblioteka, Otdel rukopisei (RGB OR) f. 178, M9803 
(Vospominaniia A. N. Kulomzina), d. 5, l. 26; A. I. Vasil´chikov, Zemlevladenie i zemledelie 
v Rossii i drugikh evropiskikh gosudarstvakh (St. Petersburg: M.M. Stasiulevich, 1876), 1:xxxii, 
2:859, 999; N. M. Iadrintsev, “Polozhenie pereselentsev v Sibiri,” Vestnik Evropy, no. 8 (1881): 
617; Iadrintsev, “Nashi vyseleniia i kolonizatsiia,” Vestnik Evropy, no. 7 (1880): 448–86.
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most authoritative form and with strategic breadth in the political testament 
of Nikolai Khristianovich Bunge, chairman of the Council of Ministers, who 
died in 1895. Bunge did not consider internal migration a panacea, nor was he 
motivated by Russifying frenzies; he envisioned the survival of local languages 
alongside Russian, used as the empire’s unifying language. Yet Bunge played a 
direct role in drawing up resettlement legislation in the early 1890s and was 
involved in defining some specific procedures. A well-considered policy of 
peasant relocation beyond the Urals appeared to him an essential component 
in a complex strategy to prevent the “socialist danger” and the “detachment 
of the peripheries”—that is, nationalistic secession.24 
While one basis for resettlement was the perceived need for preemptive 
reform, another factor was the modernizing impulse characteristic of the last 
two decades of the century, accompanied by the widespread, official, and 
unofficial perception of an urgent need to close the economic gap. These were 
the years when, after the famine and epidemic of 1891–92, the Marxist Petr 
Berngardovich Struve exhorted the intelligentsia to “admit our backwardness 
and learn from the school of capitalism.”25 The expression “impoverishment 
of the center” summarized a much-debated issue and the findings of special 
commissions. The backdrop of poverty-stricken rural areas in European 
Russia brought accounts extolling the unexploited resources of Asiatic Russia 
even more to the fore. Positivist culture interpreted demographic increase as 
a major factor in social evolution, thus reinforcing the belief that populating 
space also meant advancing along the stages of human society.26 The idea 
of colonization as productive enhancement of territory, in itself not a new 
concept in imperial discourse, found further significance in the conviction 
that developing its borderlands would offer a powerful stimulus to the 
empire’s overall growth, enabling Russia to overcome its backwardness.
Phraseology such as “drawing the borderlands closer to original Russia,” 
the official rationale for building the Trans-Siberian Railway, came to include a 
24 N. Kh. Bunge, “Zagrobnye zametki,” Reka vremen, no. 1 (1995): 198–254. On Bunge’s 
role in formulating the resettlement policy, see RGB OR f. 178, M9803, d. 5, ll. 1–5; 
V.˛L. Stepanov, “N. Kh. Bunge i voprosy pereselencheskoi politiki v 80–90-e gody XIX 
veka,” in Politika tsarizma v Sibiri v XIX–nachale XX v. (Irkutsk: Irkutskii gosudarstvennyi 
pedagogicheskii institut, 1982), 118.
25 P. B. Struve, Kriticheskie zametki k voprosu ob ekonomicheskom razvitii Rossii (St. Petersburg: 
I.˛M. Skorokhodov, 1894), 288.
26 The historian and sociologist M. M. Kovalevskii is one example. See N. D. Kondrat´ev, “Rost 
naseleniia kak faktor sotsial´no-ekonomicheskogo razvitiia v uchenii M. M. Kovalevskogo,” 
in M. M. Kovalevskii: Uchenyi, gosudarstvennyi i obshchestvennyi deiatel´ i grazhdanin (1851–
1916) (Petrograd: A. F. Marks, 1917), 180–95.
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range of goals with multifarious connotations.27 It was not easy to distinguish 
social and economic reforms from expansionistic ambitions, the consolidation 
of internal rule from the conquest of new territories, and the search for 
international power from the decision to deal with unresolved problems. 
“Colonization” had several objectives: promoting modernity and social 
cohesion, developing communications, gradually overcoming asymmetries 
of territorial administration, and pursuing a gradual standardization of state 
territory along cultural, linguistic, and identity-forming lines.28 The variety 
and breadth of these aims added moral and ideological value to the traditional 
political-military bases of governing the empire’s eastern regions: for example, 
consolidating control over recently conquered territory by garrisoning 
recruits and supplies in difficult-to-defend areas.29 Pride in being Asia’s 
civilizers went together with the desire to renew the Russian homeland, and 
these expectations could manifest themselves in a variety of political forms. 
At the end of the 19th century, the “resettlement cause” was enthusiastically 
supported not only within the official hierarchy but also by the public at 
large. In 1891, the symbolic journey from Vladivostok to Moscow made 
by the tsarevich, the future Nicholas II, conveyed the message of a renewed 
possession of the eastern territories by the ruling family.30 Yet this dynastic 
scenario co existed with multiple colonization plans with objectives that could 
be socialist, liberal, or generically modernizing and patriotic.
Stronger emphasis on the peasantry as a key participant in the colonization 
process represented a new cultural assumption that further increased the 
appeal of resettlement as a national cause. Those in favor of liberalizing 
population transfers beyond the Urals argued that the traditional mobility of 
Russian villagers should be recognized as a long-neglected but valuable part 
of the imperial mission, and that the peasants’ tendency to “wander” would 
facilitate colonization. It was necessary to accept that “these gray, needy, 
ignorant, and ill-equipped people are carrying to the remote periphery the 
27 Kolonizatsiia Sibiri v sviazi s obshchim pereselencheskim voprosom (St. Petersburg: 
Gosudarstvennaia tipografiia, 1900), 121.
28 L. M. Dameshek and A. V. Remnev, eds., Sibir´ v sostave Rossiiskoi imperii (Moscow: Novoe 
literaturnoe obozrenie, 2007), 51–61.
29 Since the 1850s, these goals had been evolving and increasingly encompassed questions 
related to the demographic profile of the outlying regions. See Peter Holquist, “To Count, to 
Extract, and to Exterminate: Population Statistics and Population Politics in Late Imperial and 
Soviet Russia,” in A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin, 
ed. Ronald G. Suny and Terry Martin (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 117–20.
30 Ot Vladivostoka do Ural´ska: Putevoditel´ k puteshestviiu Ego Imperatorskogo Vysochestva 
Gosudaria Naslednika Tsesarevicha (St. Petersburg: Ministerstvo vnutrennikh del, 1891), 1; 
Richard Wortman, Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 2:324–30.
72 ALBERTO MASOERO
powerful spirit of the Russian state, … which incessantly and impetuously 
extends the confines of our fatherland for the glory of Russian Power.”31 The 
assimilation of outlying territories was increasingly represented as a physical 
and symbolic “peasantization,” with new Orthodox churches and new villages 
with Russian names and three-field crop rotation replacing nomadic animal 
herding. In many ways, the vocabulary of colonization was related to the 
populist idea of the peasant as the true bearer of Russia’s national identity.
Seen in this light, the government project paralleled the pioneering 
ruralism envisioned by the socialists. Sergei Nikolaevich Iuzhakov supported 
“large-scale, organized resettlement” and defined colonization as “the most 
powerful means to extend popular [i.e., communal] land tenure.” He 
theorized the penetration of Central Asia as the expression of a “non bourgeois, 
non capitalistic country” based “on the peasant principle,” which was as such 
ideologically opposed to British imperialism. Iuzhakov took as an example 
the “American system” of allotting homesteads to new immigrants, but he 
insisted that new villages be granted collective rights to possession of state 
land. He supported peasant colonization as a way to affirm the communal 
principle beyond the Urals at a time when its virtues were being questioned 
in the center.32
Many officials and experts came from a populist or liberal milieu, close 
to the progressive intelligentsia that had rallied to the peasants’ support 
after the famine of 1891–92; those assigned to the Ussuri or the Steppe 
Region considered this to be a way of helping hungry emigrants arriving 
there.33 Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Kornilov, later famous for his work as a 
historian and leader of the Constitutional Democratic Party, ignored the 
advice of his liberal friends and joined state service in Irkutsk because he 
wanted to aid peasant resettlement in accordance with the tenets of patriotic 
constitutionalism. The zemstvo statistician Fedor Andreevich Shcherbina, 
who headed the expedition to study nomads’ use of land in the Steppe 
Region, applied the analytical categories he had developed in his study of the 
peasant economy in European Russia (the famous “production-consumption 
budgets”) to the discussion of how to identify space that could be assigned 
31 “Zhurnal Komiteta Sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi” (27 January 1899), in Materialy kantseliarii 
Komiteta ministrov (St. Petersburg: n. p., 1899), 7, 24 (Russian National Library); Remnev and 
Suvorova, “Upravliaemaia kolonizatsiia,” 164.
32 S. N. Iuzhakov, Anglo-russkaia raspria: Nebol´shoe predislovie k bol´shim sobytiiam. Politicheskii 
etiud (St. Petersburg: Russkaia skoropechatnia, 1885), 4; Iuzhakov, “Pereselencheskii vopros,” 
Severnyi vestnik, no. 8 (1886): 25–27, 30–32.
33 One example is N. A. Sborovskii, a member of social democratic circles as a student and 
later second-in-command in the Tomsk Resettlement Administration: Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv 
Omskoi oblasti (GAOO) f. 2668 (N. A. Sborovskii), op. 1, d. 1, ll. 14–151.
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to settlers.34 Working as a surveyor in the newly founded Resettlement 
Administration meant identifying areas in the taiga or the steppe where new 
groups arriving from European Russia could settle. It was a concrete way of 
serving the people by giving “land to those who work it.” Peasant colonization 
could be experienced as a social and patriotic mission.
At the same time, however, the desire to “impetuously extend the frontiers 
of our homeland” weakened the effectiveness of the reformist impulse, which 
to some extent inspired colonization. Inevitably, the annexation of new 
and remote regions made assimilation an even more complicated task. The 
logic of territorial expansion became particularly destabilizing when, as in 
the Far East in the years leading up to the 1905 revolution, power politics 
intersected with the rhetoric of a grandiose Asian dream. Visions such as 
Esper Esperovich Ukhtomskii’s “asianism” erased not only the mental but 
also the political boundaries between Russia and the East. Although these 
unofficial undercurrents were programmatically anticolonial in their 
ideological motivations, they acquired an aggressive geopolitical stance, 
exemplified in the claim that “beyond the Caspian Sea, the Altai Mountains, 
and Lake Baikal we cannot find a clearly defined border … beyond which our 
rightful land ceases to be.”35 Arguments for colonization as an expansionist 
tool resurfaced in 1916, on the eve of another Russian revolution. The official 
report from an expedition to northern Persia argued that, in view of Persia’s 
weakness and the imminent collapse of the Ottoman state, spontaneous 
peasant migration would serve the strategic goal of further conquests in the 
south; an appropriate demographic policy would transform the Black and 
Caspian seas into “internal Russian regions.” Migration was justified using 
all available ideological arguments: economic modernization, geopolitical 
destiny, the Byzantine historical legacy, the Russian people’s civilizing role 
in Asia (cultural superiority), as well as Russia’s proximity to the Orient 
(cultural closeness), not to mention the more prosaic advantage that the 
34 A. A. Kornilov, “Vospominaniia,” Minuvshee, no. 11 (1991): 95–97; Aziatskaia Rossiia, 
1:541–43; F. A. Shcherbina, Krest´ianskie biudzhety (Voronezh: V. I. Isaev, 1900); I. W. 
Campbell, “Settlement Promoted, Settlement Contested: The Shcherbina Expedition of 1896–
1903,” Central Asian Survey 30, 3–4 (2011): 423–36. Remnev and Suvorova note that there 
was a “compromise between state service and populist ideals” (“Upravliaemaia kolonizatsiia,” 
157).
35 E. E. Ookhtomsky (Ukhtomskii), Travels in the East of Nicholas II, Emperor of Russia When 
Cesarewitch (Westminster, UK: Constable, 1900), 2:287; Marlène Laruelle, “ ‘The White 
Tsar’: Romantic Imperialism in Russia’s Legitimizing of Conquering the Far East,” Acta 
Slavica Iaponica 25 (2008): 127; David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, Toward the Rising 
Sun: Russian Ideologies of Empire and the Path to War with Japan (DeKalb: Northern Illinois 
University Press, 2006), 42–60; David McDonald, United Government and Foreign Policy in 
Russia, 1900–1914 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).  
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“New Orangeland” (Novaia Apel´siniia) of the south would replace costly 
imports of citrus fruit from Italy.36
The consequences of this ambiguity could be ruinous. By the early 
20th century, Manchuria had been occupied de facto and some Russians 
had already begun to call it “our first colony in the Far East.”37 The lack of 
clear definitions about what qualified as “internal” and “external” sharpened 
international tensions that would lead to the war with Japan and to the 
subsequent military defeat, helping to cause the 1905 revolution. Seen in this 
light, the colonization of Russia’s remote borderlands had disastrous effects 
on the center. It can be argued that its results were diametrically opposed 
to those envisioned by those government officials who had conceived the 
development of Asiatic Russia as a contribution to reform and political 
stability in the empire. The “absence of a clear boundary between foreign 
and domestic policy” also complicated the pursuit of colonization as state 
building.38
A New and Better Russia
The paradox of the later period, especially the years after 1906, is that 
migration became more difficult to control (the peak was reached in 1908, 
with almost 700,000 people passing through the resettlement point in 
Cheliabinsk) at the very time when it was invested with the most ambitious 
purposes.39 The project began to encounter serious difficulties in practice, 
generating criticism and protests, just as the notion of colonization became 
charged with a significance that intensified its ideological value and potential 
for transformation. The debate no longer unfolded within ad hoc inter-
ministerial bodies but spread to the political–institutional context of the 
Duma monarchy, where budgets had to be discussed publicly and defended 
against criticism from national minorities and the press. Colonization policy 
became a battleground of ideas, requiring a public campaign to affirm, above 
36 G. F. Chirkin, Otchetnaia zapiska o poezdke vesnoi 1916 g. v Astrabadskuiu i Mazanderanskuiu 
provintsii Severnoi Persii (Petrograd: GUZZ, 1916), 42–45; G. F. Chirkin, Kolonial´nye interesy 
v sovremennoi voine i nashi zadachi na Blizhnem Vostoke (Petrograd: GUZZ, 1915), 19–23. On 
Russian plans for northern Persia, see Peter Holquist, “In Accord with State Interest and the 
‘People’s Wishes’: The Technocratic Ideology of Imperial Russia’s Resettlement Administration,” 
Slavic Review 69, 1 (2010): 167–69.
37 A. Khvostov, “Russkii Kitai: Nasha pervaia koloniia na Dal´nem Vostoke,” Vestnik Evropy 
36, 10 (1902): 653–96.
38 A. V. Remnev, “Geograficheskie, administrativnye i mental´nye granitsy Sibiri,” Elektronnyi 
zhurnal ‘Sibirskaia zaimka,’ no. 8 (2002): 1 (www.zaimka.ru/08_2002/remnev_border, 
accessed 29 August 2011). 
39 Aziatskaia Rossiia, 1:492.
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all in St. Petersburg, the viability of internal migration as a patriotic and 
modernizing endeavor.40
A more interventionist approach was to some extent a consequence of 
experience in the field. The organized transfers undertaken from the 1890s on 
had brought to light difficulties and limits. It had become clear that opening 
new means of communication and assigning large land areas to the immigrants 
was insufficient. New settlements needed infrastructure, ongoing investment, 
and above all increased supervision.41 Colonization institutions were given 
additional responsibilities beyond simply organizing the migrants’ journey to 
the east: they had to ensure the “settlers’ solid, productive establishment and 
[the administration’s] comprehensive support of their subsistence.”42 
In 1910, the government announced its decision to postpone extending 
the right to elect local administrative bodies (zemstva) even to the most “ready” 
(from the imperial point of view) eastern provinces of Tobol´sk and Tomsk. 
Simultaneously, the Resettlement Administration was made responsible for 
more systematic territorial and economic planning and given wider powers 
and increased resources (although in practice enforcing its decisions proved 
difficult). Ideologists began to portray the Resettlement Administration 
as nothing less than a “zemstvo executive of all Asiatic Russia”: the true 
interpreter of “local needs” and a centralized agent of enlightenment, social 
improvement, and modernization.43 Such descriptions were meant to affirm 
the authority of the colonization apparatus as a single, all-powerful agency 
within the complicated hierarchy of the late empire’s litigious administrative 
bodies (ministries, Cossack administration, governors, etc.).
At the same time experts and government officials emphasized the 
peasant settler’s inadequacy. The traditional image of a rough-hewn patriot 
and spontaneous colonizer was ambivalent from the start, since the migrants 
belonged to a category of subjects—former serfs—deemed incapable of self-
government outside the restricted world of the village. Yet it is in the 1890s 
that we find peasants portrayed in the specialized literature as inexperienced, 
40 See, e.g., the exchange between A. A. Kaufman, Pereselenie: Mechty i deistvitel´nost´ 
(Moscow: Narodnoe pravo, 1906); and A. Uspenskii, “Deistvitel´nost´, a ne mechty,” Voprosy 
kolonizatsii 2 (1907): 1–28.
41 S. Iu. Vitte, “Vnutrennee obozrenie: Znachenie kolonizatsii Sibiri i budushchnost´ 
nashikh tikhookeanskikh portov, po vsepoddaneishemu dokladu ministra finansov,” Russkoe 
ekonomicheskoe obozrenie 8, 2 (1903): 84–92. Coquin noted a “certain crisis in the traditional 
migratory movement” in the early 20th century (La Sibérie, 710).
42 Aziatskaia Rossiia, 1:464.
43 V. P. Voshchinin, Pereselencheskii vopros v Gosudarstvennoi Dume III-ego sozyva: Itogi i 
perspektivy (St. Petersburg: n. p., 1912), 100; Uspenskii, “Deistvitel´nost´,” 28; “Soobshchenie 
N. L. Skalozubova o sibirskikh voprosakh v Gosudarstvennoi Dume” (25 July 1910), in 
Sibirskii listok (Tiumen´: Mandrik, 2003), 3:389–98; Remnev, “Rossiiskaia vlast´,” 170.
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shiftless, and wasteful, a tendency that continued and intensified in the 
years that followed. Peasant settlers appear as targets more often than as 
protagonists of the civilizing mission. Experts and officials distinguished 
between simple “peopling” and “true colonization,” contrasting the need 
for “active colonizers” (deiatel´nye kolonizatory) with the reality of a needy 
mass of “settlers” ( pereselentsy). The most important interpretive contribution 
published in these years, Aleksandr Arkad´evich Kaufman’s Pereselenie i 
kolonizatsiia (Resettlement and Colonization), revolved around the idea that 
the peasants’ low “level of culture” posed a limit to the actual demographic 
capacity of a seemingly boundless space and therefore reduced the potential for 
successfully populating the peripheries. The peasant colonists’ backwardness 
was seen as a subjective, immaterial hurdle that could be overcome only 
through educational policies.44
This realization did little to stop the emergence of approaches that recast 
obstacles as opportunities. The rationale for peasant colonization—that the 
process would simultaneously civilize native populations and enlighten and 
uplift Russian immigrants—fostered the hope that the borderlands would 
be the site of radical renewal. Resettlement was presented as an opportunity 
to build a better Russia as the “new places” appeared—in theory at least—
free from the burden of stifling tradition. The debate on colonization was 
influenced by diverse and often competing projects, both reforming and 
revolutionary, and these became more radical after 1905.
This shift in vision was not limited to official circles and was shared by 
advocates of very different political persuasions. In Lenin’s approach, for 
example, the center–periphery spatial hierarchy was based on the persistence 
of what he called “feudal remnants.” The legacy of serfdom still dominated 
gentry estates in interior regions—the aforementioned “impoverished center”—
but became progressively less common in the southern and especially eastern 
territories, where it was still possible to cultivate “as far as the plough will 
go.” Considered from this point of view, the borderlands featured agriculture 
without land rent. Building on Karl Kautsky’s and Aleksandr L´vovich 
Parvus’s theories of agrarian economy, Lenin called this model “American” 
and defined it as the complete absence of limits to capitalist development, 
the maximum degree of freedom and productive rationality possible in the 
44 On “active colonizers,” see A. Stishinskii, “Gg. Gubernatoram: Tsirkuliarno,” 11 January 
1893, n. 13771, in Materialy Zemskogo otdela (St. Petersburg: Ministerstvo vnutrennikh del, 
1882–95), 1–7 (Russian National Library); A. A. Kaufman, Pereselenie i kolonizatsiia (St. 
Petersburg: Obshchestvennaia pol´za, 1905). Whether accurate or exaggerated, pessimistic 
views about the settlers abounded. See the evidence provided in Remnev and Suvorova, 
“Russkoe delo,” 160–79; and Alberto Masoero, “Autorità e territorio nella colonizzazione 
siberiana,” Rivista Storica Italiana 115, 2 (2003): 467–69.
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given historical conditions. The idea of a higher level of capitalist intensity 
made it possible to portray the borderlands as the vanguard of pan-Russian 
development.
Lenin’s opposition to tsarist colonialism did not involve the denial of 
an extraordinary modernizing destiny for the eastern periphery—which, on 
the contrary, he described in optimistic and imaginative terms. His criticism 
focused on the narrowly class-based, pro-nobility bias and Russifying nature 
of state policy, which constrained Russia’s colonizing potential. He held that a 
political break was necessary to release the intellectual and productive energies 
of the masses. A revolution would transform the “semi-Asiatic” Russian 
peasant into a historical agent and therefore, in the future, into an energetic 
colonizer capable of populating the vast expanses of Siberia. Replying to 
Kaufman’s caution in a chapter titled “The Question of Colonization,” Lenin 
stated that the true obstacle to peasant resettlement was social and political, 
rather than cultural. The “antifeudal” revolution would turn Russia’s periphery 
into a space for boundless future growth; its internal colonization would be 
analogous to the westward expansion of the United States.
Russia possesses a gigantic [land] fund for colonization that will become 
accessible to its people and accessible to the culture, not only with every 
step forward in agricultural technique in general but also with every 
step forward in the process of freeing the Russian peasant masses from 
the yoke of serfdom. This circumstance is the economic basis of the 
bourgeois evolution of Russian agriculture according to the American 
model.45
On the opposite side of the political spectrum, Prime Minister Stolypin 
also put great store in the destiny of Asiatic Russia. He saw western Siberia 
and the Steppe Region as a “cradle still free of social conflict,” where, through 
colonization, a “new and powerful Russia could grow.”46 In this case, the 
goal was to make the peasant a solid pillar of what Stolypin called a future 
“Great Russia.” The purpose was to transform impoverished, supposedly lazy, 
and rebellious troublemakers (the memory of the 1905–7 agrarian revolts 
was still fresh) into hard-working, patriotic landowners who would willingly 
respect the authorities. The central role played by the resettlement policy 
within Stolypin’s program of reforms was also grounded on the belief that a 
new, highly mobile frontier society, where stable social norms were not yet 
45 V. I. Lenin, “Agrarnaia programma sotsial-demokratii v pervoi russkoi revoliutsii 1905–
1907 gg.,” in Polnoe sobranie sochinenii (Moscow: Izdatel´stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1979), 
16:230.
46 S. E. Kryzhanovskii, “Zametki russkogo konservatora,” Voprosy istorii, no. 4 (1997): 113.
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ingrained, offered the opportunity to implement change that required endless 
mediation in the center, political battles, and bitter debates.
Despite the reforming thrust of his public declarations, the prime minister 
privately expressed a sense of urgency and danger, a further variant of the 
fear of losing control over the periphery that had previously characterized 
the debates on the concept of colony. Returning from his official journey 
to Asiatic Russia in 1910, he wrote to Nicholas II that “Siberia is growing 
fabulously.” Nonetheless, he also warned that success brought risk: the rise 
of an “enormous, rude, democratic country that soon will take Russia by the 
throat.” He was referring to the rapid growth of a communal peasant society 
largely independent of the center and still lacking a trustworthy local elite, an 
almost too successful plebeian colonization in vast regions where state control 
was remarkably thin. Not by chance, he insisted on the “need to couple the 
resettlement policy with strong reinforcement of administrative authority in 
the periphery.”47
The campaign to assign individual plots to immigrants in Siberia was 
based on a similar combination of anxiety and hope for rapid change. It was 
deemed vital to fix the basis of rational agriculture from the start (an “easier and 
more rewarding task in Siberia”) before the Great Russian archaic, communal 
institutions also became rooted in the resettlement areas.48 The copious 
cartographic production of colonization organizations began to include 
plans for model villages in the steppes: since the objective of colonization 
was to teach the Russian-European colonist the virtue of private property 
and intensive agriculture, even before the immigrants arrived, farmland was 
divided into well-ordered plots). In various competing ways, Siberia had 
come to be seen as an ideal place for social experimentation.
The concept of colonization as a strategy of both imperial rule and 
assimilation of the borderlands underwent a semantic shift, especially in some 
more specialized sectors of the administration, toward the older idea of an 
agricultural colony capable of progressing more rapidly than the metropolis. 
The regions of settlement now appeared not only as distant places in which to 
spread culture and institutions from the center—according to an authoritarian 
Russifying impetus to some or a desire for more prudent management of local 
interests to others—but also as the theater of a society in the making. The 
47 P. A. Stolypin to Nicholas Romanov, 26 September 1910, in “Iz perepiski P. A. Stolypina 
s Nikolaem Romanovym,” Krasnyi arkhiv 5, 30 (1928): 82–83; A. V. Krivoshein and P. A. 
Stolypin, Zapiska Predsedatelia Soveta ministrov i Glavnoupravliaiushchego zemleustroistvom 
i zemledeliem o poezdke v Sibir´ i Povol´zhe v 1910 godu (St. Petersburg: Gosudarstvennaia 
tipografiia, 1910), 29–30, 123.
48 The quotation is from G. F. Chirkin, “O zadachakh kolonizatsionnoi politiki v Sibiri,” 
Voprosy kolonizatsii 8 (1911): 11.
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appeal of the “resettlement cause” combined enthusiasm for the acceleration 
of progress with almost utopian aspirations of a veritable metamorphosis 
of the “Russian person.” The hyperbolic reports of Vladimir Petrovich 
Voshchinin, one of the apologists of migration policies under Stolypin and 
Krivoshein, echoed Lenin’s American parallel. He eulogized with futurist 
coloring the “cinematographic speed [with which] the cities grow, the creative 
labor blazes untiring.” He contrasted the “slow step” of the “old Russia” with 
the places “where five years ago eagles soared and jackals roamed, and now 
motor vehicles rush about with noise and clamor,” referring to the trucks used 
for transporting the migrants.
The builders of this new life—clearly American in style—are the 
emigrants, those same gray muzhiki we are accustomed to seeing 
in tattered greatcoats, who hasten to raise their hats when they see a 
cockade [i.e. functionary]. Siberia regenerates man [Sibir´ pererozhdaet 
Settlement project divided in family lots (otruba) in the Akmolinsk region
Source: Aziatskaia Rossiia (St. Petersburg: A. F. Marks, 1914).
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cheloveka]. The Russian peasant, fearful and forgotten by history, raises 
his head as soon as he treads the boundless space of the steppes or the 
forest and is no longer limited in means; he builds his life in the new 
places, forgetting the routine of “Russia.”49
The State Colony as a Plantation
Democratic overtones, hostility to the agrarian nobility, and empathy with the 
settlers’ plight were widespread among mid-level officials in the Resettlement 
Administration, who appeared to some of their contemporaries to be “left-
wingers” (levye) or even “populist idealists.” These attitudes did not contradict 
an increasingly interventionist interpretation of peasant migration as “state 
policy in the widest sense of the word.”50 In the specialist literature the word 
“colony” was no longer euphemistically masked or shaded in insecurity. It 
was used with pride and programmatically affirmed as the foundation of a 
promising avenue of social and productive growth. The word now denoted 
the entire, immense extension of Asiatic Russia. 
49 V. P. Voshchinin, Na Sibirskom prostore: Kartiny pereseleniia (St. Petersburg: Nash vek, 
1912), 5.
50 A. A. Tatishchev, Zemli i liudi: V gushche pereselencheskogo dvizheniia, 1906–1921 (Moscow: 
Russkii put´, 2001), 35, 42; Chirkin, “O zadachakh,” 1.
Resettlement vehicle in the Baraba steppe
Source: V. P. Voshchinin, Na sibirskom prostore (St. Petersburg: Nash vek, 1912).
TERRITORIAL COLONIZATION IN LATE IMPERIAL RUSSIA 81
Migration was consistently presented as a contribution to the spread of 
Russian culture, but nationalistic motivations, while certainly important in the 
imperial policy of those years, were generally less conspicuous in the treatises 
produced by experts on resettlement. Local officials expressed uneasiness 
about orders to Russify, which they considered artificial impositions from 
the center.51 The definition of colony was connected to a specific economic–
productive and legal condition rather than geographic remoteness or ethnic 
difference. The goals of sedentarizing the Kazakh nomads and “intensifying” 
the Slavic immigrants’ agriculture were based on the same modernizing ethos. 
This civilizing mission was overseen and managed by the imperial state, in 
practice a group of enthusiastic intellectuals and administrators working in 
or with its ministries after 1905. The young colonizers of the Resettlement 
Administration adopted the official line of Stolypin’s policy (although they 
did not always fully agree with it), in which the impulse for reform was always 
tempered by more prudent reasons of state.
What distinguished the tsarist colony in spatial and social terms from 
other regions of the state? How did the measures routinely described using the 
word kolonizatsiia differ from the promotion of economic growth in general? 
Gennadii Fedorovich Chirkin, who was to become the last director of the tsarist 
Resettlement Administration, wrote of a vast reserve of “free land—that is, not 
privately owned.” The more official Aziatskaia Rossiia (Asiatic Russia [1914]), 
personally edited by the strongman of the resettlement apparatus, Grigorii 
Viacheslavovich Glinka, called the lands east of the Urals “our sole colony.” 
These territories differed from the rest of the empire because “from the border 
between Europe and Asia to the coasts of the Pacific Ocean, except for the 
holdings of the indigenous population in Turkestan, there is almost no private 
[landed] property. In conformity with the tsar’s title, according to which the 
sovereign is the possessor [obladatel´] of the territory, in Asiatic Russia almost 
all the land belongs exclusively to the state.” The persistence of the state’s right 
to the territory of Siberia and the Steppe Region made these lands a gigantic 
“single state domain [gosudarstvennoe imenie] with small numbers of permanent 
users [vechnye pol´zovateli] in the most developed areas.”52
Georgii Konstantinovich Gins’s essay “Resettlement and Colonization” 
(1913) was the last comprehensive analysis of the subject before the demise 
of the empire. A student of the liberal jurist Petrazhitskii, Gins emphasized 
the legal dimension and showed an impressive knowledge of the Western 
51 See Tatishchev, Zemli i liudi, 112; and his comments on the “monstrous” requirement to 
rent land only to “Russian workers of the white race” in the Far East.
52 Chirkin, “O zadachakh,” 1; Aziatskaia Rossiia, 1:532; Uspenskii, “Mechty i deistvitel´nost´,” 
24; Krivoshein and Stolypin, Zapiska, 28.
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literature on colonization. His definition of colony was not limited to the 
geographic and demographic fact of a sparsely populated territory with vast 
reserves of unexploited natural resources. What distinguished “colonization 
as an all-embracing development of the productive forces” was the “absence 
of effective owners” and the condition in which the “colonizing state is the 
proprietor in the sense of private law [khoziain v smysle chastnopravnom], the 
owner of the land and its resources.” When natural resources are “secured 
to private possessors [chastnye obladateli ],” Gins argued, there could be no 
colonization, because “state policy … collides with the psychology of the title 
holder” and therefore “does not always act with the desired speed.” Legal 
obstacles included pre-existing personal property but also corporate rights 
such as the landowning privileges of the Cossacks and dynastic patrimony, 
such as the Cabinet’s holdings in Altai. These now appeared to be a legacy 
of an archaic concept of state property (personal property of the sovereign, 
“exclusive” property of the Treasury or forestry department). They were all 
personal or juridical “private subjects” (chastnye sub˝ekty) that interfered with 
“true”—that is, modern, systematic, and productive—colonization of the 
territory.53
This analysis rejected the periphery’s image as a relatively free frontier 
society (populated over the centuries by Cossacks and political exiles, religious 
dissidents, and fugitive peasants), as it had been depicted throughout the 
19th century from the Decembrists to Shchapov, from Iadrintsev to Grigorii 
Nikolaevich Potanin.54 More important, this form of colonization was seen as 
superior to the historical experience of Western colonialism. Gins called the 
latter “de facto colonization,” the unintended result of “European nations’ 
civilizing influence on some Asian states,” and he held that it lacked an overall 
plan, while modern colonization required unimpeded will and conscious 
design. Its main precondition was the absence of any legally binding, 
particularistic control over the use of the natural environment. Centuries of 
tsarist history had preserved broad, albeit archaic and imperfect “state rights” 
to the land, water, and mineral resources of Siberia. Therefore, its vast expanses 
offered the most “fertile soil on which colonization could be sown.” Despite 
profound ideological differences, Gins’s argument bore some resemblance to 
Lenin’s idea of land nationalization as the destruction of all “feudal remnants” 
53 G. K. Gins, “Pereselenie i kolonizatsiia,” Voprosy kolonizatsii 13 (1913): 39–40.
54 A. E. Rozen, Zapiski dekabrista (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblott, 1870), 318; A. P. 
Shchapov, “Zemstvo,” 753–59; N. M. Iadrintsev, Sibir´ kak koloniia v geograficheskom, 
etnograficheskom i istoricheskom otnoshenii (St. Petersburg: Sibiriakov, 1892, 1st ed. 1882); G. 
N. Potanin, “Zavoevanie i kolonizatsiia Sibiri,” in Zhivopisnaia Rossiia: Otechestvo nashe v ego 
zemel´nom, istoricheskom, plemennom, ekonomicheskom i bytovom znachenii, ed. P. P. Semenov 
(St. Petersburg: Vol´f, 1884), 11, 31–48.
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and as a precondition for Russia’s development along the “American path.” 
The main difference was that Lenin envisaged a revolutionary upheaval 
followed by the unleashing of the masses’ productive potential, while Gins 
stressed the role of the central authority as a prudent, humane manager and 
legislator over a vast res nullius inherited from the tsarist past.55
In Gins’s enlightened vision the principle of state property was not meant 
to justify mass expropriations or brutal population transfers. It was meant 
to lead not to arbitrariness but to the introduction from above of multiple 
layers of new rights, understood as a set of tools that could bring about social 
change and productive development. His vision of colonization incorporated, 
quite consciously, the tradition of paternalistic reformism rooted in the 
experience of the Ministry of State Domains, the precursor of the Ministry 
of Agriculture in its various denominations, where generations of experts 
and administrators had practiced direct management of state properties and 
state peasants without the mediation of the serf owners.56 The state colony 
represented a legal vacuum that could be filled with a differentiated set of 
forms of possession carefully chosen and “cultivated,” as though they were 
different botanical species that corresponded to different productive types 
and social functions. 
Nomads were to enjoy temporary land rights until they were sedentarized. 
Peasants and non-Russian sedentary “aliens” (inorodtsy) were to be assigned 
property rights with the prohibition of sale “for at least the lifetime of one 
generation,” a measure taken to prevent speculation. Large landholdings for 
entrepreneurs such as livestock breeders or cotton planters were to be assigned 
as long-term rentals of state territory to avoid their use as unproductive 
latifundia, while private mining companies were to be granted temporary 
concessions of state mineral rights. In one significant respect, however, Gins’s 
taxonomy of legal and productive categories differed from Stolypin and 
Krivoshein’s unrealized project, set forth in the 1910 Siberian Land Statute. 
It did not foresee the introduction of large “private land property” (chastnaia 
zemel´naia sobstvennost´ ) for the “civilized” elements of a future landowning 
elite. This was a further sign of the mistrust toward the nobility common 
among colonization officials of the time.57
55 Gins, “Pereselenie,” 39–40. Gins joined the anti-Bolshevik forces and ended his life as a 
pioneer in the study of Soviet law at Berkeley: George Guins, “Professor and Government 
Official: Russia, China, and California” (Berkeley: University of California, Bancroft Library, 
Regional Oral History Office, 1966). See Lenin’s comments on land nationalization as a 
“clearing of estates” or chistka zemel´ (“Agrarnaia programma,” 253).
56 Gins, Sel´skokhoziaistvennoe vedomostvo, 38, 53–60.
57 Gins, “Pereselenie,” 49, 76, 83–92; “Polozhenie o pozemel´nom ustroistve krest´ian i 
inorodtsev na kazennykh zemliakh Sibirskikh gubernii i oblastei,” in Programma reform P. A. 
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Reality, both de jure and de facto, challenged the narrative of an authority 
intent on molding the borderlands’ social landscape according to a plan, 
whether this was tempered by humanitarian legal consciousness, as in the 
case of Gins, or was more focused on productive development, as in Chirkin’s 
or Uspenskii’s proposals. Resettlement and ruling the territories involved 
compromise, adjustments, and often the acceptance of existing conditions. 
This was true in Turkestan, where imperial law was often in conflict with 
Islamic notions of property, and in Transbaikal, where attempts to limit the 
Buryats’ land use generated endless legal proceedings that seriously delayed 
settlement operations. The neopatrimonial spatial rhetoric underpinning the 
interventionist ideology of colonial development clashed with the empire’s 
legal structure and its many avenues for lodging appeals. Local courts 
encountered difficulties in reconciling the principle of state management 
of natural resources with existing rights and customs. The most stubborn 
resistance to the Resettlement Administration’s projects came from other 
branches of the bureaucracy pursuing competing agendas. Maximizing rent 
from state forests, for example, conflicted with setting aside land for new 
settlements. Colonization officials were required to carefully assess local 
needs and productive potential in order to calculate the optimal amount of 
land that should be assigned to the settlers, but they often found this task 
impossible because they lacked trained personnel. They were then authorized 
to establish boundaries on the basis of the size of existing lots. In practice, 
the goal of introducing “rational” agriculture from above and establishing 
clear-cut regulations amounted to the legalization of customary use.58 The 
intensifying technocratic propensity implicit in the colonization ideology 
of the years 1910–14 should be seen as a guiding principle rather than an 
Stolypina: Dokumenty i materialy, ed. P. A. Pozhigailo (Moscow: Rosspen, 2002). On the 
important distinction between elitist “private property” and peasant “individual property,” 
see Yanni Kotsonis, “The Problem of the Individual in the Stolypin Reforms,” Kritika 12, 1 
(2011): 29.
58 Paolo Sartori, “Colonial Legislation Meets Shari’a: Muslims’ Land Rights in Russian 
Turkestan,” Central Asian Survey 29, 1 (2010): 43–60; Ekaterina Pravilova, “The Property of 
Empire: Islamic Law and Russian Agrarian Policy in Transcaucasia and Turkestan,” Kritika 12, 
2 (2011): 353–86. On Buryat lands, see Russkaia natsional´naia biblioteka, Otdel rukopisei 
(RNB OR) f. 742 (P. A. Stolypin), d. 2, ll. 2–3 (letter from A. V. Krivoshein to Stolypin, 
29 October 1910). On rational vs. customary definitions of land use, see GAOO f. 46 
(Tiukalinskaia pozemel´no-ustroitel´naia partiia), op. 1, d. 1, ll. 60–61 (Tobol´sk Resettlement 
Administration, Circular, 27 September 1910). On the relationship between colonization and 
land rights, see Alberto Masoero, “Layers of Property in the Tsar’s Settlement Colony: Projects 
of Land Privatization in Siberia in the Late 19th Century,” Central Asia Survey 29, 1 (2010): 
9–32.
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unhindered practice, as one element in a complex interplay of factors shaping 
the evolution of local society in the regions of settlement.59
Nevertheless, the search for a legally “empty” and socially alterable 
territory represented a fundamental component of the mindset of the group of 
practitioners and theorists who contributed to the journal Voprosy kolonizatsii. 
Adding more land to the “colonization fund” was a typical concern at the 
time, a goal achieved by both selfless exploration of the inhospitable taiga 
and reducing nomads’ pasturelands in the steppes.60 These efforts involved 
exerting the authority of the Resettlement Administration over vast areas 
previously entrusted to allegedly “sleepy” authorities, such as the Department 
of Forestry; the practice sometimes generated more intrabureaucratic 
conflicts than land disputes with native populations.61 The frantic search for 
“supplies” (zagotovki ) of cultivatable land was the consequence of the pressing 
need to settle the numerous irregular immigrants who had arrived in the 
great wave of transfers between 1907 and 1909. At the same time, the quest 
for an ever-expanding space ready for settlement also reflected the ambition 
to create a realm free from interference and competing prerogatives within 
the segmented, multilayered geography of imperial authority. The notion of 
colonial territory had become associated with the ever elusive, disputed ideal 
of “virgin soil” that would be directly subordinated to expert supervision, a 
field where there were no obstacles to the creation of new social forms.62 
This explains the ambivalence that characterized the last generation of 
imperial colonizers. To a degree, the young, enthusiastic resettlement officials 
expressed “antifeudal” feelings in Lenin’s sense of the word. Their ethos 
was “democratic” inasmuch as they were against the privileged or parasitic 
appropriation of public resources. A socialist flavor was also implicit, since 
in their vision, land should be distributed among settlers according to their 
presumed need. Colonizers considered themselves agents of modernization, 
dedicated to applying techniques in the borderlands they had drawn from a 
59 Holquist, “In Accord with State Interest,” 152.
60 See the expedition and ten-year plan for the Narym region: A. A. Prazdnikov and N. A. 
Sborovskii, Narymskii krai: Svodka otchetnykh dannykh po obsledovaniiu v 1908–1909 gg. 
chinami Tomskoi Pereselencheskoi organizatsii levoberezhnoi—po Obi—chasti Narymskogo kraia 
(Tomsk: Sibirskoe tovarishchestvo pechatnogo dela, 1910).
61 A few examples are documented in GAOO f. 46, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 34–35, 44–46, 50–51.
62 The search for a new definition of “public property” documented in Ekaterina Pravilova’s 
innovative analysis did not contradict the colonizers’ ambitions and in fact gave their authority 
a stronger interventionist connotation. See E. Pravilova, “Les ‘res publicae’ russes: Discours 
sur la propriété publique à la fin de l’empire,” Annales: Histoire, sciences sociales 64, 3 (2009): 
579–609.
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competent study of foreign experience (whether Danish dairies or irrigated 
agriculture in Idaho).63
At the same time, however, these central policies competed with and 
hampered multiple local initiatives or “awakenings,” undertaken in a spirit 
of public modernization, by both Russian and non-Russian groups.64 The 
policies were regularly described in the regional press as bureaucratic plans that 
interfered with the autonomous efforts of cooperative organizers, activists, 
and entrepreneurs from below.65 To the extent to which it was conceived as 
radical and accelerated transformation, the colonization project carried with 
it both an authoritarian and destabilizing potential.66 Whereas in the 1890s, 
Bunge had warned against resettlement as a mechanical “transplanting” of 
core institutions to the periphery, post-1910 formulations employed the 
gardener metaphor more unconditionally and forcefully. References to Francis 
Bacon’s early modern scientific utopia and his vision of colonization as the 
cultivation of society figured prominently as a source of inspiration in the 
programmatic vision outlined by Gins (“Planting of countries is like planting 
of woods… . For government, let it be in the hands of one, assisted with some 
counsel”). Gins repeated the statement twice: “To colonize a country is like 
planting woods.”67 Even before the war, the project of a colonial society built 
from above was being prepared to interact with the construction of a socialist 
society. 

It is not surprising that ideas and people that participated in the tsarist 
colonization experience passed to the Soviet context. Their passage, which 
has been documented by Peter Holquist, was neither automatic nor 
predetermined; in many ways, it was comparable to that of other categories 
63 One example was E. E. Skorniakov, Oroshenie i kolonizatsiia pustyn´ shtata Aidago v Severnoi 
Amerike, na osnovanii zakona Keri (Carey Act) (St. Petersburg: R. Golike i A. Vel´borg, 1911).
64 Ilya V. Gerasimov, Modernism and Public Reform in Late Imperial Russia: Rural Professionals 
and Self-Organizations, 1905–1930 (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009).
65 N. Skalozubov, “Pis´ma deputatov” (14 May 1909), Sibirskii listok, no. 3 (Tiumen´: 
Mandrik, 2003), 183–85. See Masoero, “Il regionalismo siberiano nel contesto imperiale 
russo,” 1008–92, for an interpretation of Siberian patriotism as an ideology of colonization 
and regional modernization led by the local intelligentsia in competition with the imperial 
government.
66 Charles Steinwedel, “Resettling People, Unsettling the Empire: Migration and the 
Challenge of Governance,” in Peopling the Russian Periphery, 128–47.
67 Bunge, “Zagrobnye zametki,” 21; Sir Francis Bacon, “Of Plantations,” in Bacon’s Essays 
(Boston: C. S. Francis and Co., 1857), 329, 331; G. K. Gins, Pereselenie i kolonizatsiia (St. 
Peterburg: F. Vaisberg i P. Gershunin, 1913), 1:34; Gins, “Pereselenie,” 40.
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of prerevolutionary experts, such as the economists and statisticians studied by 
Alessandro Stanziani.68 By 1919, at the peak of the Civil War, Voshchinin was 
trying to resuscitate a journal meant to be a Soviet sequel to Voprosy kolonizatsii. 
Siberia and Central Asia were controlled by the anti-Bolshevik forces, and all 
attention had turned to the northern regions of Murmansk and Arkhangel´sk. 
Voshchinin applied the same arguments to them that had been applied to the 
eastern steppes—which suggests that the notion of Orient plays a secondary role 
in understanding the profound nature of these phenomena. The same author 
who had a few years earlier celebrated the new-found dignity of the peasants 
in the borderlands, spoke of prewar policies as “amateurish” (kustarnicheskie), 
unsystematic measures. He described peasant migration in the Stolypin era as 
the “transport of human scum” ( peresadka chelovecheskoi nakipi ) beyond the 
Urals, an extreme example of the tendency to see colonists as passive targets 
rather than active protagonists of “organized” colonization. He recalled the 
prerevolutionary Resettlement Administration as the valuable precursor of a still 
integral and efficient “colonizing apparatus,” an operative machine that needed 
to be launched, finally equipping it with those “dictatorial powers” that the 
tsarist government had never really granted it. The theories and practices of the 
late imperial experience, he explained, were to be converted; the objectives of 
colonization could hence be summarized as the “development of the productive 
forces” and the realization of the “state economy on a large scale.”69
Conclusion
While colonization contributed to the “complicated process of transforming 
Siberia and the Far East into Russia,” its motivations were neither mono-
centric nor static.70 Rather than a single, gradually implemented project 
of national–imperial assimilation, the concept emerged from a debate that 
reached different points of equilibrium at different stages. There was no 
consensus about what society had to be “extended” to the new territories, and 
the goal was pursued with varying degrees of intensity, relying on different 
tools at different times. Peasant migration had been a “fact of life” for centuries 
and the state had employed population policies before. The distribution of a 
multiethnic labor force in its territories predated the adoption of a European 
colonial vocabulary and the founding of the Resettlement Administration. 
68 Holquist, “In Accord with State Interest,” 171–79; Alessandro Stanziani, L’économie en 
revolution: Le cas russe, 1870–1930 (Paris: Albin Michel, 1998).
69 V. Voshchinin, “Gosudarstvenno-neotlozhnye zadachi kolonizatsii,” Ocherednye voprosy 
kolonizatsii, no. 1 (1919): 9–13. Voshchinin’s change of attitude was striking, since he had 
written a laudatory essay on Krivoshein in 1916. See Holquist, “In Accord with State Interest,” 
176.
70 The quotation comes from Remnev, “Vdvinut´ Rossiiu v Sibir´,” 223.
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The idea of building a better society on a peripheral tabula rasa was hardly 
new.71 Modern ideologies of colonization did not overturn these patterns 
of spatial transformation; they grew out of them, adding a stronger yet 
ambivalent intensity that emerged from the challenging context of the 
postreform era. Over time, supervised migration to the peripheries came 
to be seen as a powerful instrument for changing society and Russia itself. 
It evolved from a set of approaches used to govern an expanding dynastic 
empire to become a political myth, a strategy for accelerating modernization 
charged with patriotic and even socialist overtones. It reflected the sensitivity 
of an age of revolutions no less than one of empires.
Russian interpreters adopted the term “colony” reluctantly or saw the 
colony as a transitional stage.72 This was because, by the middle of the 19th 
century, the word was associated with political independence. Insofar as 
colonies appeared as a “new political organization,” they conflicted with 
an intensifying notion of territorial integrity articulated along imperial or 
national lines.73 By contrast, “colonization” had wide appeal. It gave spatial 
expression to the desire to perform a civilizing mission, interpreted in a 
variety of ways. Opponents questioned its feasibility, not its merit. Yet this 
rhetoric covered different motivations. Some, but not all, involved a colonial 
or even imperial viewpoint. The debate took off after a military defeat, at a 
time of high expectations for reform. It intensified after political and social 
crises of increasing gravity (1881, 1891, 1905–7). Regardless of its success 
in transforming territory (which, at least in Siberia, was quite significant), 
colonization was pursued with an enduring sense of ambivalence, aptly 
captured in Remnev and Suvorova’s image of an “uncertain Kulturträger.”74 
This is why, as Sunderland noted, two words, rather than one, were used to 
describe the phenomenon: resettlement and colonization. Experts developed 
their specialized knowledge from Leroy-Beaulieu’s migration/colonization 
dichotomy, which encompassed both savagery and cultural superiority. This 
dual terminology projected a cultural distance already present in the civilizing 
core onto the peripheries.75
“Resettlement” involved a precarious spreading over the territory. It 
denoted survival in an environment which, though difficult, could also be 
71 Andreas Schönle, “Garden of the Empire: Catherine’s Appropriation of the Crimea,” Slavic 
Review 60, 1 (2001): 1–23; Sunderland, Taming the Wild Field, 70, 87–88.
72 Remnev, “Rossiiskaia vlast´,” 162.
73 The quoted phrase is from Jürgen Osterhammel, Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview 
(Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2005), 4, 10.
74 Remnev and Suvorova, “ ‘Russkoe delo’ na aziatskikh okrainakh,” 219–21.
75 Sunderland, “Empire without Imperialism?” 103–05; A. Etkind, “Bremia britogo cheloveka, 
ili vnutrenniaia kolonizatsiia Rossii,” Ab Imperio, no. 1 (2002): 275.
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romanticized. At best, it satisfied the material needs or wasteful greed of the 
poor. It entailed the risk of de-Russification, poverty, and death, depicted in 
Sergei Vasil´evich Ivanov’s painting On the Road: Death of a Settler (1889). 
“Colonization” instead denoted a purposeful, economically solid, and 
culturally influential transformation of the environment. Only the latter term 
evoked national dignity and “progress.” The two words were used together 
in a variety of ways, but they were also cyclically contrasted to express past 
inadequacies about to be overcome by a better future approach. The meaning 
of colonization intensified over time, from providing “assistance to the 
migrants” to organizing people’s lives in the new places, and finally, after the 
revolution, to building a “state organization of social production.”
Resettlement started to become a “cause,” a systematic policy, and a 
specialized field in the late 1870s and early 1880s when peasants, intellectuals, 
and government officials literally, as well as figuratively, crossed the Urals to 
pursue parallel, not necessarily mutually exclusive agendas. Peasants sought 
their ideal of a better life in spatial terms and located it further eastward. 
Intellectuals studied the “new places” and projected upon them their own 
notions of civic commitment and sociopolitical renewal. Government 
officials started to see peasant migration to the Asiatic provinces as a way 
of strengthening the state after the revolutionary crisis of 1881. A narrower 
understanding of migration as “tsarist welfare” evolved into a strategic project 
of integrating and modernizing the borderlands. The concept’s flexibility and 
vagueness allowed it to accommodate diverse motivations under the banner 
Sergei Ivanov, On the Road: Death of a Settler (1889)
Source: The Yorck Project, 10,000 Meisterwerke der Malerei (DVD, 2002) via Wikimedia 
Commons. This image is in the public domain worldwide as part of the Yorck Project.
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of “colonizing Asia.” It provided the opportunity for a compromise between 
state priorities and service to the people, although this compromise was 
precarious.
The ideological intensity of the post-1907 period reflected political 
instability and a desire for modernity. The emergency created by an 
unprecedented migratory wave coincided with a degree of “disillusionment 
with the colonization potential of the Russian people.”76 These factors produced 
the widely shared belief that, more than ever before, peasant spontaneity was 
not enough. Colonization required dramatic, powerful gestures of some sort: 
special institutions, more resources, planning, infrastructures, new laws, 
education, or some combination of these. The reformism that postdated the 
conflicts of 1905 further emphasized the cultural significance of Asiatic Russia 
as a testing ground of the empire’s greatness, Russia’s dignity as a nation, 
and its ability to become prosperous. Existing discursive patterns, such as the 
image of a rapidly growing new society, therefore became more prominent. 
The previous emphasis on assimilation was partially modified by the hope of 
building a better Russia in the periphery.
The desire to populate and develop did not automatically lead to a single 
authoritarian solution. Resettlement officials sometimes acted at the local 
level in ways that blurred the distinction between government-appointed 
colonizer and community organizer.77 Lenin argued that a revolution and 
a new state were needed for Russia to exploit its immense Asiatic potential. 
Among ideologists of the central Resettlement Administration, these 
attitudes evolved into a promethean vision of cultivating modernity with 
unrestrained will. Their technocratic propensity was a consequence, as much 
as a cause, of a semi-utopian understanding of borderland development as 
social transformation on a grand scale. That is why this component of the 
tsarist elite, at this time (1910–14), began to define Asiatic Russia as a colony.
In their understanding, the word did not signify a territory inhabited 
by non-Russian peoples that would be dominated and governed by separate 
institutions. It denoted the dream of a moldable space, where reformers could 
freely build railways and canals, found new villages and cities, implement 
updated technology, sedentarize the nomads, attend to the transformation of 
the Russian peasant into a “new person,” and do so without the limitations of 
competing ministerial interests, socially conservative landowners, or powerful 
76 Remnev and Suvorova, “Upravliaemaia kolonizatsiia,” 170.
77 The head of the Transbaikal resettlement organization, D. M. Golovachev was eulogized 
as a Siberian patriot, an influential elected member of the municipal duma, and an effective 
colonization official. See the collection of obituaries from Siberian newspapers in “Dmitrii 
Mikhailovich Golovachev: Nekrolog,” Voprosy kolonizatsii 14 (1914): 447–59.
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governors. This is why the definition of colony included an emphasis on the 
image of Asiatic Russia as a gigantic state domain. Unrealized proposals 
to turn the Resettlement Administration into a ministry of Asiatic Russia 
were a logical consequence of the desire to provide reformer-colonizers 
with the authority to achieve these goals.78 Gins proposed perhaps the most 
sophisticated argument for such development, although the vision of a “state 
plantation” entrusted to legislator-colonizers could not mesh easily with the 
institutional and political reality of the late tsarist state.
At the same time, representing colonization in productive and demographic 
terms made it possible to conceive of it independently from the tsarist imagery 
of rule.79 The only comparative diagram in the Resettlement Administration’s 
Atlas aziatskoi Rossii (Atlas of Asiatic Russia [1914]) mentioned neither 
“empires” nor “colonies” and did not distinguish between a civilized west 
and a colonial east. It rather compared the “size and population” of the “main 
states in the world” (including China, Argentina, and Norway). In each case, 
a populated “metropolis,” if one existed, was somewhat arbitrarily separated 
from an outlying, unnamed, and sparsely inhabited area. Demographic 
density was the only criterion of spatial difference. On this list of examples, 
Asiatic Russia differed from European Russia merely as a contiguous territory 
waiting to be populated and developed.80 Thus understood, colonization 
could survive the demise of the empire and persist in the Soviet period as a 
word, a set of techniques, and a complex of ideas interacting with the ideology 
of a very different statehood.
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